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“LAWCRAFT”:  CHINA’S EVOLVING 
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
Captain Matthew H. Ormsbee* 
INTRODUCTION 
As enthusiasm for the modern Pax Americana1 budded, bloomed, and 
now, by many accounts, withers, the United States must grudgingly reckon 
with its waning influence in a world that turns increasingly to China as a 
rising superpower.2  The coming years will likely provide an answer to the 
burning question of whether China will outpace the United States as a 
superpower, and, if so, how the United States can safeguard its national 
security in an environment in which it is no longer the uncontested world 
leader.  The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy orients defense 
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necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of 
its components. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline 
Became Inevitable, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-
western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/ [https://perma.cc/WE2H-ZDQS] (defining Pax 
Americana as “the post-1945 international order . . . in which the United States employed its 
overwhelming power to shape and direct global events”). 
 2. See, e.g., Dan Balz, America’s Global Standing is at a Low Point.  The Pandemic 
Made It Worse., WASH. POST (July 26, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/reckoning-america-world-standing-
low-point/ [https://perma.cc/2XGN-QHGQ] (noting that, “[i]n this climate, China’s 
leadership has gained a larger advantage in the ‘great power competition,’ and the other player, 
Russia, is now on a more even level with the U.S.”); see also STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 2020:  
INTO A NEW ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION 186 (Thomas F. Lynch III ed. 2020) 
(describing the shift in the global balance of power, in particular:  “While major aims have 
remained consistent, the power differential between Washington and Beijing has changed over 
the past 20 years.  It has moved in Beijing’s favor in terms of economic influence and selected 
measures of conventional military power, most notably in areas near China.”); ANONYMOUS, 
THE LONGER TELEGRAM:  TOWARD A NEW AMERICAN CHINA STRATEGY 16 (ATL. COUNCIL 
2021) [hereinafter “THE LONGER TELEGRAM”], https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/The-Longer-Telegram-Toward-A-New-American-China-
Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KHZ-5PN8] (stating that “[t]here is a subtle yet corrosive 
force that has been at work in the United States’ national psychology for some time now, 
raising doubt about the nation’s future and encouraging a sense that, as a country, America’s 
best days may now be in the past”). 
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professionals toward long-term strategic measures as adversaries’ 
capabilities gradually match or exceed American capabilities.3  In this 
context, the United States is in a tug-of-war with China as our primary pacing 
challenge.4 
As China’s economy and military swell, the U.S. Department of Defense 
can view strategic competition through the traditional lens of military 
maneuvers.  Yet, strategic competition in the form of legal maneuvers 
deserves much greater attention.  The Chinese Communist Party will 
continue to use lawfare against adversaries; but, increasingly, it will rely on 
“lawcraft,” a more threatening offshoot of lawfare that is characterized by 
conjured interpretations of law more akin to witchcraft than statecraft.5  
China’s embrace of lawcraft denotes the use of law as a tool of subterfuge to 
mislead and coerce adversaries, particularly in clashes over territorial rights, 
maritime entitlements, and anti-access/area denial abilities.6  In this respect, 
China will wield international law as a sword to extend its might, justify its 
rise, and outdo the United States, while engaging in conflict just below the 
threshold of traditional war.7  How exactly China does so and how the United 
States can use law as a shield will determine how robustly the United States 
can compete long-term to achieve its national security objectives. 
This Article confronts a key question of our time:  as the United States’s 
global power slowly ebbs and China’s power incrementally grows without 
resort to armed conflict, is the international system for peaceful dispute 
 
 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  SHARPENING THE AMERICAN MILITARY’S COMPETITIVE EDGE 1 
(expressly stating that “[i]nter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary 
concern in U.S. national security”). 
 4. WHITE HOUSE, INTERIM NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 6 (2021) 
(underlining the challenges inherent in a “growing rivalry with China”). 
 5. “Lawfare” is a term popularized by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S.A.F. 
(Ret.), to describe “the use of law as a weapon of war.”  See The Meaning of Lawfare, 
LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/topic/meaning-lawfare [https://perma.cc/9MPS-
3TC7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military 
Interventions:  Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st [Century] Conflicts (Nov. 29, 2001), 
http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2KD-BRRH]; see also Robert 
Williams, International Law with Chinese Characteristics:  Beijing and the “Rules-Based” 
Global Order, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201012_international_law_china_williams.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8E3F-6CUK] (stating that “China exhibits a flexible and functional 
approach to international law that enables it to benefit from and exploit the international order 
without the need to advocate fundamental changes to the letter of the law in most areas”). 
 6. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “is an attempt to deny an adversary’s freedom of 
movement on the battlefield.  Anti-access—of enemy military movement into an area of 
operations—utilizes attack aircraft, warships, and specialized ballistic and cruise missiles 
designed to strike key targets.  Area denial—denial of enemy freedom of action in areas under 
friendly control—employs more defensive means such as air and sea defense systems.” 
China’s Anti-Access Area Denial, MISSILE DEF. ADVOC. ALL. (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-
threat/china/china-anti-access-area-denial/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/XH7J-FVJ7]. 
 7. See Michael J. Mazarr, This Is Not a Great Power Competition:  Why the Term 
Doesn’t Capture Today’s Reality, FOREIGN AFFS. (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-05-29/not-great-power-competition 
[https://perma.cc/6H25-YUJH]. 
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resolution resilient enough to contain potential Chinese abuses and preserve 
American values?  Part I provides background on the liberal world order 
following World War II and China’s special status as an increasingly 
assertive autocracy.  Part II addresses dispute settlement in the context of 
respect for rule of law, particularly as it relates to a high-profile arbitration 
proceeding that the Philippines brought against China.  Finally, Part III puts 
forth several solutions to combat lawcraft and secure U.S. national security 
interests in an increasingly Sinocentric world. 
I.  CHINA’S POWER GAINS AS AMERICA’S AUTHORITY WANES 
A.  Relative American Atrophy 
Following World War II, the United States relished in its historic victory 
and emerged as the flagbearer of a new international order.8  The United 
States was largely unchallenged as a great power for decades during the Pax 
Americana, enabling it to establish a norms-based liberal world order based 
on democratic legal principles.9  The post-Cold War era of international 
relations, coinciding roughly with President Bill Clinton’s first term, is 
commonly dubbed a unipolar moment in history in which the United States 
was the unquestioned world power.10  From 2006 to 2008, however, this 
chapter started to near its end, and by 2014, the United States found itself in 
a fundamentally different situation of great power competition with China 
and Russia.11  In the following years, China has repeatedly questioned and 
weakened the American-led international order that has flourished since 
World War II.12 
If the United States’s international might and influence is indeed waning 
as many experts believe, then our national security apparatus should 
increasingly rely on a sturdy architecture of international law and dispute 
resolution to uphold global norms and rights.13  This should take center stage 
as a vital part of U.S. grand strategy, thereby curbing potential legal abuses 
 
 8. See generally Thomas Wright, The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-
world-trump-authoritarianism/569881 [https://perma.cc/U3ED-HZMA]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL43838, RENEWED GREAT POWER 
COMPETITION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE—ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (Oct. 7, 2021), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK42-KLPA]. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See generally Eric Sayers, Commentary, Thoughts on the Unfolding U.S.-Chinese 
Competition: Washington’s Policy Towards Beijing Enters Its Next Phase, WAR ON THE 
ROCKS (Feb. 9, 2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/thoughts-on-the-unfolding-u-s-
chinese-competition-washingtons-policy-towards-beijing-enters-its-next-phase 
[https://perma.cc/2CJA-AWFB] (stating that “China’s predatory and coercive behavior under 
President Xi Jinping has increased rapidly in recent years, targeted against Uighur Muslims, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Australia, Japan, and others”). 
 13. See id. 
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by China and “preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.”14  
Should China achieve regional hegemony, American policymakers might 
take solace in the fact that unarmed disputes could conceivably be resolved 
in favor of the United States on the basis of legal arguments rather than 
resorting to armed conflict.  This issue is all the more vital as China’s 
priorities often conflict with the United States’s priorities, and China grows 
more comfortable dictating the terms of the global agenda.15 
B.  Chinese Ascendency 
Central to China’s ascendency is its economic engine.16  Its economy has 
expanded exponentially for decades, notching nearly 10 percent gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth per year since 1978.17  In terms of GDP, 
China has become the second largest global economy behind only the United 
States, accounting for 18 percent of global GDP.18  At least one expert 
believes that China will surpass the United States as the largest global 
economy in the near future.19  Today, China is the largest merchandise 
trading partner of sixty-four countries, including Germany; the United States 
counts only thirty-eight countries.20  In addition, since the global financial 
crisis of 2008, China has exceeded all other countries in terms of 
contributions to world economic growth, seizing headlines and burnishing its 
image as a benevolent economic overseer.21  Although the COVID-19 
pandemic momentarily dampened the Chinese economy, within a year it 
came back stronger than ever.22 
 
 14. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10485, DEFENSE PRIMER:  GEOGRAPHY, STRATEGY, AND 
U.S. FORCE DESIGN 1 (Nov. 5, 2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10485/12 [https://perma.cc/6ZQM-UBTW]. 
 15. See THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 31 (“If this is an accurate account of 
Xi’s core interests, then it is a separate exercise to determine which of them are compatible 
with US interests, which potentially overlap, and which are now in fundamental conflict.  
Prima facie, most of these core interests of Xi’s Communist Party would now fall in the 
‘conflict’ category.”). 
 16. See, e.g., How to Deal with China, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2021), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/01/09/how-to-deal-with-china 
[https://perma.cc/GUC8-GJ5X]. 
 17. The World Bank in China:  Overview, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview [https://perma.cc/R668-C9R4] (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2021). 
 18. See id.; see also How to Deal with China, supra note 16. 
 19. See, e.g., Katie Holliday, China to Become Largest Economy by 2024, CNBC (Sept. 
9, 2014, 6:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/07/china-to-become-largest-economy-by-
2024.html [https://perma.cc/FX25-VY4R]. 
 20. See How to Deal with China, supra note 16. 
 21. See The World Bank in China:  Overview, supra note 17. 
 22. Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Economy Surges, and So Does Its Currency, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/business/china-renminbi-yuan-
strong.html [https://perma.cc/NGG2-52ZS] (“China is a rare bright spot in an otherwise 
ravaged global economy.  The coronavirus has been tamed within China’s borders, at least for 
now.  The nation’s factories are charging ahead full steam.  The world’s shoppers—many of 
them stuck at home or unable to buy plane or cruise ship tickets—are buying all the Chinese-
made computers, televisions, selfie ring lights, swivel chairs, gardening tools and other 
2021] LAWCRAFT 5 
Economic growth nurtures other forms of national power, feeding a 
Chinese nation that has steadily expanded its military power.23  By one 
estimate, China’s military capabilities may be on par with the United States’s 
military capabilities by 2035, and China may be able to overcome the United 
States in a military conflict by midcentury.24  For this reason, China has been 
dubbed a near peer of the United States and a “rising power,” as opposed to 
a “status quo power.”25  For its part, the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy 
labels China a “revisionist” state.26  China has shown that it is committed to 
creating a “post-West” global order that prioritizes Chinese interests and is 
conducive to authoritarian rule.27  As great power competition reenters the 
lexicon of policymakers and military strategists, Chinese exceptionalism will 
receive renewed attention, setting the stage for conflict between a ruling state 
and a rising state.28 
More and more, China demonstrates that it is not a standard developing 
country, but rather a special developing country and an economic 
powerhouse with the potential to emerge as a great power.29  Similar to 
Russia, China seeks to create a multipolar world in which China moves to 
 
accouterment of nesting that they can.  China’s share of world exports rose to a record 14.3 
percent in September, according to data compiled by Jefferies & Company.”). 
 23. See Steven Lee Myers, China, Its Military Might Expanding, Accuses NATO of 
Hypocrisy, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2021, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/world/asia/china-nato-military.html 
[https://perma.cc/YD55-5T24] (stating that “[w]hile China poses virtually no direct military 
threat to Europe, which is NATO’s home field, it can now flex its military power in ways that 
were unimaginable only a few years ago – not only in Asia, but also globally”); see also 
China’s Military Strategy (English), ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA 
(May 26, 2015), http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/1435159/1435159.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A4SR-WJLD]. 
 24. Nancy A. Youssef, China Aims to Outpace U.S. Militarily, American Commander 
Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-aims-to-
outpace-u-s-militarily-american-commander-says-11607459776 [https://perma.cc/B36C-
Z4PL] (“China is seeking to invest its economic growth into equaling American military 
capabilities by 2035 and aims to be able to defeat the U.S. in an armed conflict by midcentury, 
the top U.S. military commander said.  ‘They are on a path to try to do that,’ Army Gen. Mark 
Milley said of Beijing’s ambitions in an interview at The Wall Street Journal’s CEO Council 
summit on Tuesday.  ‘It is certainly a significant security challenge for the United States now 
and in the years to come.’  To defend against a rising China, the U.S. must develop its own 
economic and military power, Gen. Milley said.  He warned, ‘We don’t want great-power 
competition to turn into great-power war.  That would be a disaster.’”). 
 25. See generally Wang Jisi, China’s Search for a Grand Strategy:  A Rising Great Power 
Finds Its Way, FOREIGN AFFS., Mar./Apr. 2011, at 68; see also THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra 
note 2, at 6 (“[China] is no longer a status quo power.  It has become a revisionist power.”). 
 26. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 25 
(2017). 
 27. See generally Angela Stent, Russia and China:  Axis of Revisionists?, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Feb. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_russia_china_stent.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV8F-
SCVQ]. 
 28. See Lionel Beehner & Liam Collins, Dangerous Myths:  How the Crisis in Ukraine 
Explains Future Great Power Conflict, MODERN WAR INST. AT W. POINT (Aug. 18, 2020), at 
5. 
 29. See CONGYAN CAI, THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:  TAKING CHINESE 
EXCEPTIONALISM SERIOUSLY 85 (2019). 
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center stage.30  This is particularly worrisome as Beijing employs 
intimidation tactics to erode the sovereign rights of neighboring states in the 
South China Sea, bullying others out of offshore resources, asserting 
unilateral dominion, and replacing international law with the mantra of 
“might makes right.”31  Still, until China’s military powers equal that of the 
United States, China will likely pursue its national objectives in ways that 
are unarmed but no less adversarial to U.S. interests.32 
II.  “LAWCRAFT” IN THEORY AND APPLICATION 
While China’s economic engine revs, the Chinese Communist Party’s 
leadership quietly builds up the nation’s military and postures to peacefully 
overtake the United States as a global leader.33  Until that time, however, 
armed conflict with the United States would almost certainly be detrimental 
to China, and the two nations will remain locked in a “[c]ontest for 
[a]llegiance, [n]ot [s]urvival.”34  Key to China’s posturing is an evolving 
approach to international law and international dispute settlement, which 
represents a sharp departure from China’s historic aversion to transnational 
dispute resolution.35  Pundits once agreed that China was “highly critical of 
the international legal order led by the West” from the time that the People’s 
Republic of China was founded in 1949 through the initiation of the 
Reforming and Opening-Up Policy in the late 1970s.36  In this time period, 
China was viewed as a revolutionary state that had little to do with the outside 
 
 30. See generally Eugene Rumer, Russian Strategic Objectives:  It’s About the State, in 
CURRENT RUSSIA MILITARY AFFAIRS:  ASSESSING AND COUNTERING RUSSIAN STRATEGY, 
OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AND MODERNIZATION 1, 1–5 (John R. Deni ed., 2018). 
 31. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Position on Maritime 
Claims in the South China Sea (July 13, 2020), https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-
maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZU-3275]. 
 32. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 2 (“After several decades of US/NATO 
dominance following the fall of the Soviet Union, the world appears to have returned to a 
period of great power competition that includes limited conflict.  And while it may not have 
the same fear of nuclear escalation or periphery conflict, there remain new methods of conflict 
that need to be understood.”). 
 33. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 8 (“[China] has rapidly become more assertive.  It 
is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, 
and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international 
system.”). 
 34. John Sullivan, Trapped by Thucydides?  Updating the Strategic Canon for a 
Sinocentric Era, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Dec. 28, 2020), 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/trapped-by-thucydides-updating-the-strategic-canon-for-
a-sinocentric-era [https://perma.cc/9MNF-AWBD]; see also THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra 
note 2, at 11 ( “China remains for the time being highly anxious about military conflict with 
the United States, but that this attitude will change as the military balance shifts over the next 
decade.  If military conflict were to erupt between China and the United States, and China 
failed to win decisively, then—given the party’s domestic propaganda offensive over many 
years proclaiming China’s inevitable rise—Xi would probably fall and the regime’s overall 
political legitimacy would collapse.”). 
 35. See generally JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974). 
 36. Id. 
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international legal order.37  However, as China gradually opened up to the 
outside world since the late 1970s, China’s approach to international law 
became (and remains) an important concern among international lawyers.38 
China has voluntarily adopted legal constraints on its autonomy, partly as 
a result of membership in international organizations, but also partly because 
Chinese leaders are concerned that international law could become an 
impediment to the country’s rise.39  Thus, until now, Chinese leaders have 
never attached such “great importance to international law, even though it 
might be rhetorical.”40  Importantly, the emerging global system has become 
more interconnected and regulated as China steps increasingly into the 
international legal framework after several years of insular development, 
leading to speculation over how exactly China will interpret and embrace 
international law.41  This is critical because the trigger for a great power war 
could be a legal dispute based on China’s stubborn belief in a historical right 
to islands or shoals in the South China Sea.42  As recently as 2020, the United 
States and Australia published official opinions that China’s claims in the 
South China Sea are unlawful, posturing for potential future conflict.43 
A.  “Lawcraft”:  China’s Evolving Approach to International Law 
China’s approach to international law and its use of international dispute 
settlement has long been unclear.44  For many years, China eschewed 
international adjudication—with its open and transparent proceedings and 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Remarks at the Opening 
Ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1327570.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/4S5W-DSD5] (calling for a “global Internet governance system” to place 
potential limits on states, while ensuring overall accountability from all state actors); Xi 
Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Speech at the United Nations Office at 
Geneva (Jan. 18, 2017), http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XA5A-WUWG] (stating that President Xi sounds the alarm of a “double 
standard[]” application of international law). 
 40. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Carry Forward the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation 
(June 28, 2014), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/3D3T-JH7N] (“In the international society, there should be just one law that 
applies to all.  There is no such law that applies to others but not oneself, or vice versa.  There 
should not be double standards when applying the law.  We should jointly uphold the authority 
and sanctity of international law and the international order.”). 
 41. CHINA’S SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING xxiii (John Garrick & 
Yan Chang Bennett eds., 2016). 
 42. See generally Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6. 
 43. See Oriana Skylar Mastro, How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea, 
INTERPRETER (Feb. 17, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-
china-bending-rules-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/NAG5-RZFX] (noting that in 2020, 
“both the United States and Australia risked China’s wrath by officially stating that China’s 
claims in the South China Sea are unlawful.  Other claimants were pleased by this change of 
policy, but none voiced it prominently”). 
 44. See CAI, supra note 29, at 267. 
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written judgments—in favor of private negotiation and consultation, tools 
which offer China the benefits of excluding outside observers and keeping 
the nation’s invocation of international law a secret.45  This risk-averse 
approach to dispute resolution has been explained by China’s unique 
Confucian-inspired culture, the nation’s historically marginal involvement in 
international lawmaking, and the sensitivity of its disputes that frequently 
concern human rights abuses and territorial disputes.46  Thus, China had long 
been uncomfortable submitting to the voluntary jurisdiction of an 
international arbitration tribunal with the power to mandate transparent 
proceedings and hand down a binding award that could publicly harm 
Chinese interests.47 
However, China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001 signaled an evolving approach by China to international dispute 
resolution, since WTO membership necessitates a dispute settlement 
authority with mandatory jurisdiction over all WTO members.48  Notably, 
China has appeared several times before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
as both complainant and respondent.49  China turned heads once again—
renewing questions over its shifting approach to international law—as the 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 283 (explaining that “[t]he Confucian litigation-unfriendly culture can perhaps 
be considered the first factor” and “the litigation-unfriendly culture is a major reason for 
China’s reluctance to submit itself to international adjudication”); see, e.g., Vishnu Som, 
Exclusive:  China Has Built Village in Arunachal, Show Satellite Images, NDTV (Jan. 18, 
2021, 7:42 PM IST), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-has-built-village-in-arunachal-
pradesh-show-satellite-images-exclusive-2354154 [https://perma.cc/F8Z5-2KW2] (“China 
has constructed a new village in Arunachal Pradesh, consisting of about 101 homes, show 
satellite images accessed exclusively by NDTV.  The same images, dated November 1, 2020, 
have been analysed by several experts approached by NDTV, who confirmed that the 
construction, approximately 4.5 kms within Indian territory of the de facto border, will be of 
huge concern to India.  Though this area is Indian territory, according to official government 
maps, it has been in effective Chinese control since 1959.  However, earlier only a Chinese 
military post existed, but this time a full-fledged village that can house thousands has been 
built.”). 
 47. See Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, INST. FOR SEC. 
AND DEV. POL’Y, https://isdp.se/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-
disputes [https://perma.cc/LE84-FGN6] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) (stating that “[i]n terms 
of conflict resolution, China states that it prefers to resolve disputes peacefully with individual 
claimant states on a bilateral level rather than through arbitration provided by the UN or other 
forms of what it sees as ‘imposed’ dispute settlement”). 
 48. Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, BROOKINGS INST. (May 9, 
2001), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/ 
[https://perma.cc/3A79-BZJ8] (noting that “China’s membership commits it to comply with 
the principles and rules of the international trading system”). 
 49. See Map of Disputes Between WTO Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=CHN&s
ense=e [https://perma.cc/DV7R-3GW8] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); see also Disputes by 
Member, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6ENL-ERS7] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) (citing twenty-four cases in which 
China has been the complainant and forty-seven cases in which China has been the 
respondent). 
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Philippines v. China50 arbitration unfolded.  In this high-stakes dispute over 
rightful territorial access to the Nansha (Spratly) Islands in the South China 
Sea (among other claims), China made clear that it would not always take a 
reliable approach to international law in international adjudications.51  
Beijing asserted that it would not participate in the hearing, nor would it 
enforce the award rendered by the tribunal in favor of the Philippines.52  
Thus, it is unclear whether China fully and unquestionably ascribes to the 
constraints of binding international law for dispute resolution, particularly 
when a tribunal threatens to hand down a decision adverse to Chinese 
national interests.53  More worrisome, China’s approach to international law 
has historically featured flagrant legal violations held up by a flimsy façade 
of legitimacy.54 
China’s refusal to even consider arbitration is particularly concerning 
because transnational disputes will routinely be settled by tribunals seeking 
to enforce international law.55  Particularly, as China seeks greater 
involvement in the global fabric of international organizations, it will find 
itself increasingly enmeshed in adjudicative forums over disputes large and 
small.56  As it gains clout, however, China may also have greater sway in 
shaping international adjudication proceedings.57  More importantly, as 
China has grown as a global power, so too has international adjudication 
grown as a popular method of dispute resolution.58  And while less powerful 
countries have limited alternatives in international disputes, more powerful 
states enjoy numerous means to address conflicts, giving states like China a 
method to potentially flout international adjudication.59 
 
 50. See In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-
19, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
 51. Isaac B. Kardon, China Can Say “No”:  Analyzing China’s Rejection of the South 
China Sea Arbitration, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV., no. 2, 2018, at 1, 45, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=alr 
[https://perma.cc/89UF-JZJ5] (noting that “this arbitration is not the final Chinese statement 
on legal dispute resolution.  While there are few reasons to think PRC will abandon a long-
standing principle of preferring bilateral ‘negotiation and consultation’ to third party 
adjudication, there are many reasons to think it is adaptive”). 
 52. See Tom Phillips et al., Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case, 
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016, 1:21 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-
against-china [https://perma.cc/L9VV-3ENA]. 
 53. See id. (in which one expert noted that China would find the arbitration ruling 
“unacceptable to the regime” and a Chinese tabloid attacked the ruling as “more radical and 
shameless than many people had ever expected”).  See generally Julian Ku, China and the 
Future of International Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 154 (2012). 
 54. See Mastro, supra note 43 (stating that the “issue, however, is not that China flagrantly 
violates international law—it is that it does so while simultaneously creating a veneer of legal 
legitimacy for its position”). 
 55. See Phillips, supra note 52. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See Ku, supra note 53, at 171–73. 
 58. See id. at 155. 
 59. See CAI, supra note 29, at 268. 
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China’s evolving approach to international law is aptly described as 
“lawcraft,” a new term in the lexicon that builds on the term lawfare.60  
Lawcraft refers to quasi-magical interpretations of the law that go one step 
further than lawfare in which a state not only wields law against adversaries, 
but also uses it as an instrument of subterfuge cloaked as gospel.61  Under 
this theory, China’s use of law is akin to medieval witchcraft, which was once 
accepted as truth but has long ago been discredited.  China views its 
interpretations of international law as scripture; but some of its legal opinions 
are better characterized as bluster and pure subversion of the rule of law. 
B.  Philippines v. China Arbitration 
The Philippines v. China arbitration offers one of the starkest examples of 
China’s use of lawcraft to contest jurisdiction, rebuff aggrieved neighboring 
states, and flout unfavorable tribunal awards.  This arbitration concerned 
entitlements in the South China Sea, a massive 3.5 million-square-kilometer 
body of water and land features that is of extraordinary geostrategic value 
due to the sea’s fishing stock, energy resources, trade routes, and prime 
location in the Indo-Pacific Region.62  The sea has become a focal point for 
territorial and rights disputes with escalating rhetoric in recent years between 
China and several members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.63  China claims 
sovereignty over “virtually all South China Sea islands and their adjacent 
waters.”64  While China argues its sovereignty is historically established and 
uncontested (its so-called “historical territory”), the Philippines firmly 
contested absolute Chinese claims and maritime entitlements to various 
islands.65 
 
 60. See LAWFARE, supra note 5. 
 61. See Malcolm Jorgensen, China is Overturning the Rules-Based Order from Within, 
INTERPRETER (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-
overturning-rules-based-order-within [https://perma.cc/YP2F-J8C9] (stating that “[b]y 
subverting the meaning of the most foundational rules on which the order is based, China may 
already be overturning the order from within”). 
 62. Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of 
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA (Dec. 7, 2014) [hereinafter 
MFA], https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E2A6-JJDQ]. 
 63. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6; WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 10 (stating 
that the United States “will reinforce our partnership with Pacific Island states” while 
“[r]ecognizing the ties of shared history and sacrifice”). 
 64. China’s Claims in the South China Sea, INST. FOR MAR. AND OCEAN AFFS., 
https://www.imoa.ph/chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/Q78T-DKR6] 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2021). 
 65. Id.; Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, supra note 47 
(referring to Beijing’s designation of the Spratly Islands as part of “China’s historical 
territory”); see also CAI, supra note 29, at 295; State Council Info. Off. of the People’s Rep. 
of China, White Paper:  China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the 
Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, CHINA.ORG.CN 
(July 13, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of China on Negotiations on the Settlement of the South 
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Thus began several rounds of negotiations and an unwritten arrangement 
between China and the Philippines to resolve this dispute between 
themselves.66  China complained bitterly in 2013 when the Philippines later 
initiated arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), filing 
fifteen discrete claims and, most notably, seeking a decision entitling the 
Philippines to maritime entitlements to the Spratly Islands.67  China argued 
that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
mandates that if disputing parties to the convention have agreed to settle a 
dispute by any means “of their own choice,” the dispute settlement 
proceeding under UNCLOS can only apply “where no settlement has been 
reached” by such means.68  Manila countered that its filings with the PCA 
were justified and that no settlement had indeed been reached between the 
two states, nor were their bilateral talks binding.69  Beijing construed 
Manila’s decision to commence arbitration as lawfare, alleging breach of an 
unspoken agreement not to turn to a third party for dispute resolution.70  
Indeed, China later issued a Position Paper on December 7, 2014, arguing 
that the arbitration had no jurisdiction over China.71  Beijing stated that it 
would “neither accept nor participate in” the arbitration proceeding, 
consistent with its rejection of all international tribunals ruling on China’s 
territorial sovereignty over maritime delimitation in the South China Sea.72 
Nevertheless, the tribunal found on October 29, 2015, that it had 
jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties, and accepted seven out of the 
fifteen submissions from the Philippines.73  China again protested the 
decision and claimed that the tribunal’s award would be “null and void.”74  
 
China Sea Disputes], http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2016-07/13/content_38870185.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PX8W-7563]. 
 66. See Statement of China on Negotiations on the Settlement of the South China Sea 
Disputes, supra note 65, ¶¶ 5, 80–83. 
 67. See id. ¶ 6. 
 68. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 281, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397.  Settlement of Disputes by Any Peaceful Means Chosen by the Parties, states:  
“Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a 
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any 
peaceful means of their own choice.” Id., art. 280. 
 69. See Philippines Seeks U.N. Help to Resolve Maritime Row with China, REUTERS NEWS 
(Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-
idUSBRE90L0C820130122 [https://perma.cc/QH4E-M4DK] (in which Secretary del Rosario 
told reporters “[t]he Philippines has exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for 
a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime dispute with China”). 
 70. See Peter Kreuzer, Dealing with China in the South China Sea:  Duterte Changing 
Course, PEACE RSCH. INST. FRANKFURT (2018), at 4, 
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-
studies/resources/docs/PRIF-prif0318.pdf [https://perma.cc/E69W-9BX5]. 
 71. MFA, supra note 62 . 
 72. Id. 
 73. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 2015). 
 74. Statement on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea 
Arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Republic of the 
Philippines, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 30, 2015), 
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Unfazed, the tribunal proceeded and rendered a final award in favor of the 
Philippines on July 12, 2016.75  The arbitrators found that China had no 
historic right to resources within the seas falling within its “Nine-Dash 
Line.”76  While aggrieved by the decision, China reiterated its non-
participation.77  China again stated that the award was “null and void.”78 
Interestingly, President Rodrigo Duterte won the Filipino presidential 
election held on May 9, 2016, only two months before the tribunal made its 
final award.79  The Philippines soon issued a Joint Statement with China 
taking a softer approach to their dispute, promising renewed negotiations 
with them and choosing not to leverage the PCA award to the benefit of the 
Philippines.80  President Duterte’s approach raises numerous questions about 
whether the new Filipino administration would discredit international 
tribunals; whether President Duterte was merely seeking to maintain stability 
early in his tenure; whether he worried that the award was unenforceable in 
practice; and whether all along the award was pursued as leverage to bring 
China to the table for more serious negotiations.81 
In any event, the arbitral award in Philippines v. China was shocking and 
unprecedented as it levied substantial reputational costs on China.82  If 
Manila had not taken a soft stance with Beijing after President Duterte took 
office, Beijing could have been forced to dig in its heels on its aggressive 
stance or publicly concede its loss to Manila, which is hardly conceivable.83  
Certainly, the looming threat of rising reputational costs was a reason for 
China’s positive response to President Duterte’s proposal, allowing the 
Chinese to save face.84  Ultimately, the Philippines v. China arbitration 
provides several key insights into China’s evolving use of international law, 
but also offers potential methods to counteract Chinese abuses. 
 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1310474.shtml [https://perma.cc/8UPN-
Y6D3] [hereinafter Statement of China on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility]. 
 75. Award (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, July 12, 2016. 
 76. See Cecilia Yap, Philippines Says No Compromise on 2016 Sea Victory Against 
China, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2020, 6:41 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-12/philippines-says-no-compromise-on-
2016-sea-victory-against-china [https://perma.cc/SM5R-YFRT] (stating that the “Philippines 
will adhere without compromise to a 2016 court victory that nullified China’s claims in most 
of the South China Sea”); Mastro, supra note 43 (noting that a top Chinese official described 
the Nine-Dash Line as “swoop[ing] down past Vietnam and the Philippines, and towards 
Indonesia, encompassing virtually all of the South China Sea”). 
 77. Phillips, supra note 52. 
 78. See Statement of China on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 
74. 
 79. See Harry Krejsa, Rodrigo Duterte’s Turn in the South China Sea, DIPLOMAT (July 
15, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/rodrigo-dutertes-turn-in-the-south-china-sea/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8S4-RH53]. 
 80. See Kavi Chongkittavorn, ASEAN, China After the PCA Verdict:  We’re Still Friends, 
REPORTING ASEAN (July 23, 2016), https://www.reportingasean.net/asean-china-pca-
verdict-still-friends [https://perma.cc/97K2-FAU2]. 
 81. See Krejsa, supra note 79 (noting that President Duterte’s position on the South China 
Sea arbitral award remains “puzzlingly inconsistent”). 
 82. See Kreuzer, supra note 70, at 5. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
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III.  CHARTING THE BATTLEFIELD:  SOLUTION TO COMBAT “LAWCRAFT” 
The following solutions materialize as the United States gains a better 
understanding of how China approaches and uses international law to 
advance its ends, often in ways that are unfair or coercive.85  When asked 
about great power competition, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., U.S. Air 
Force Chief of Staff, stated:  “When we think about our competitors, it may 
not require exquisite or expensive platforms or long-range missiles—it may 
be us just being able to outthink our adversaries.  And you can’t outthink them 
if you don’t understand them.”86  This statement is consistent with General 
Brown’s “Accelerate Change or Lose” campaign, in which greater 
understanding of our adversaries is required in order for the United States to 
remain competitive long-term.87  General Brown is uniquely positioned to 
understand long-term competition with China, as he is the former 
Commander of the Pacific Air Forces, where he oversaw more than 46,000 
Airmen in China’s regional backyard.88 
In long-term conflicts with China and other near peers, headway must be 
made in influencing states’ behavior in a way that benefits the United States 
and stifles adversarial objectives.89  A primary tool in the U.S. arsenal is 
influencing decision-making in the rules-based international order that was 
first organized by the United States and its allies.90  In this way, the United 
States charts a battlefield for legal dispute resolution that favors U.S. 
interests.91  The following solutions are not quick fixes but rather proposals 
to gradually counter Chinese lawcraft and maintain American preeminence.  
Ultimately, great power competition is unlikely to be measured in a few years 
but rather over generations.92 
 
 85. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that “[i]n many areas, China’s leaders seek 
unfair advantages, behave aggressively and coercively, and undermine the rules and values at 
the heart of an open and stable international system”). 
 86. Oriana Pawlyk, A New Fitness Culture and the Future of Force Design:  Gen. CQ 








 88. See Pawlyk, supra note 86. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Michael Mazarr et al., Understanding the Current International Order, RAND 
CORP. (2016), at 53, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1598/RAND_RR
1598.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM5S-W7XB] (stating that U.S. strategy “seeks to manage great 
power relations by creating institutions, habits, practices, norms, and implicit or explicit rules 
that regulate competition and behavior and provide regularized avenues for cooperation”). 
 91. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6. 
 92. Sullivan, supra note 34. 
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A.  “Multilateralize” Disputes 
The United States’s long-term competitive front with China will likely 
emerge on the fault lines of global legitimacy and territorial claims.93  Micro-
skirmishes over tangibles like territorial access and intangibles like 
reputation and credibility will move the needle in favor of the United States 
or China.  No single dispute may prove decisive in maintaining a U.S.-centric 
view of the world, but legal mechanisms can play a vital role in achieving 
“combined critical mass” and preserving the U.S. competitive advantage.94  
To begin, U.S. national security stakeholders must acknowledge and 
accentuate a multilateral approach to disputes with China.95  By embracing a 
community approach rather than an individualist approach, and by relying on 
historical alliances, the United States and its allies can isolate and discredit 
China in international disputes.96 
In practice, the United States and its allies must master and leverage the 
rules applicable to disputes before the PCA, as one of the key forums in 
which future international disputes will be resolved.  For example, Article 
17(5) of the PCA Rules (governing procedures before the PCA) permits 
joinder of other interested or affected parties to a dispute.97  In the Philippines 
v. China arbitration, for instance, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan might have 
joined the arbitration and bolstered the stance taken by the Philippines.  
While the Philippines won the arbitration even absent joinder, this is in large 
part due to the strength of the Philippines’s case and China’s non-
participation.98  In future disputes, however, joinder may prove to be the 
decisive factor.  If interested parties do not qualify for joinder, then at the 
very least they may seek to file amicus briefs with the PCA, in much the same 
way that interested parties file amicus briefs in cases before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 
 93. See Beehner & Collins, supra note 28, at 6. 
 94. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that a U.S. strategy to combat 
China must be agreed upon in “sufficiently granular form with the United States’ major Asian 
and European treaty allies so that their combined critical mass (economic, military, and 
technological) is deployed in common defense of the US-led liberal international order”). 
 95. See Dan Lamothe, In Japan, Top Biden Administration Officials Attempt to Set the 
Tone on China, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2021, 9:36 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/03/15/blinken-austin-china-asia-
allies [https://perma.cc/9G67-ZZZ8] (“President Biden’s secretary of state and defense 
secretary began a multi-nation tour in Asia with a stop in Japan as they seek to address 
concerns about China with allies and partners in the region, and with Beijing directly.”). 
 96. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 4, at 10 (stating that America’s “democratic alliances enable 
us to present a common front, produce a unified vision, and pool our strength to promote high 
standards, establish effective international rules, and hold countries like China to account”). 
 97. PERM. CT. ARB., ARBITRATION RULES 2012, art. 17(5) (2012), https://docs.pca-
cpa.org/2015/11/PCA-Arbitration-Rules-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS7G-C7FM] (“The 
arbitral tribunal may, at the request of any party, allow one or more third persons to be joined 
in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to the arbitration agreement, unless 
the arbitral tribunal finds, after giving all parties, including the person or persons to be joined, 
the opportunity to be heard, that joinder should not be permitted because of prejudice to any 
of those parties.  The arbitral tribunal may make a single award or several awards in respect 
of all parties so involved in the arbitration.”). 
 98. See generally supra Part II.B. 
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The Philippines fully embraced a “community over individual” approach 
in its arbitration with China, arguing that non-parties to the arbitration still 
have a community interest in the outcome.99  Indeed, the former Filipino 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert del Rosario, framed the arbitration in the 
spirit of a class action lawsuit:  the maritime law the Philippines sought to 
clarify was important “to all coastal States that border the South China Sea, 
and even to all the States Parties to UNCLOS.”100  Secretary del Rosario 
believed that the arbitration might enhance the “rule of law in international 
relations” and, in particular, the “legal order for the seas and oceans.”101  
Thus, a multilateral view to the dispute lent credibility to the Filipino stance 
in the arbitration. 
Unsurprisingly, China—while standing by its non-participation—
maintained that the disagreement with the Philippines remained 
fundamentally bilateral in nature and urged other states in the Indo-Pacific 
Region to remain neutral and uninvolved.102  Effectively, China argued that 
the two parties to the pre-arbitration talks should remain the only two parties 
to the dispute.103  China argued that any efforts by the Philippines to 
“multilateralize” the dispute were in bad faith.104  Yet, China eventually 
conceded that the South China Sea is an enormous geographical feature that 
directly impacts many states, thus certain community interests in the South 
China Sea were inherent.105 
Admittedly, a few states agreed with China that its dispute with the 
Philippines may have been a bilateral disagreement in essence.106  China’s 
argument that the arbitration was not truly intended to defend an idealistic 
community interest, but rather for the Philippines to defend its own 
individualistic interests, resonated with some states.107  Still, China’s stance 
could rightly be characterized as lawcraft, in which China cites a technicality 
or distracts from the main point in order to shirk responsibility to a weaker 
state and coerce a better outcome.  In the future, a good-faith approach to 
community-based interests in international disputes may tip the scales in 
favor of U.S. allies.108  This is critical because other states may yet pursue 
 
 99. Alberto F. Del Rosario, Sec. of Foreign Affs., Repub. Of the Phil., Why the Philippines 
Brought This Case to Arbitration and Its Importance to the Region and the World (July 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Statement of Secretary del Rosario], 
https://tokyo.philembassy.net/02events/statement-before-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/RWZ2-HZZJ]. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. CAI, supra note 29, at 305. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 305–06. 
 106. Id. at 306. 
 107. See Wang Wen and Chen Xiaochen, Who Supports China in the South China Sea and 
Why, DIPLOMAT (July 27, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-supports-china-in-
the-south-china-sea-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/3PTY-R7UN]. 
 108. THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 2, at 8 (maintaining that multilateral credibility 
is of high importance, as China will seek to “diminish the credibility of US power and 
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legal action against China.  Vietnam, for example, is weighing this course of 
action.109  If it does, multilateral support, especially from the United States 
and regional partners, will bolster its position and bargaining power.110 
B.  Remove Politics from Law 
In the context of the Philippines v. China arbitration, Secretary del Rosario 
repeatedly stated that the Philippines merely wanted to enforce the UNCLOS 
and clarify his country’s maritime entitlements.111  If China had shirked its 
legal obligations under UNCLOS, he wondered, “what value is there in the 
Convention for small States Parties as regards their bigger, more powerful 
and better armed neighbors?”112  Thus, the Filipino government stated that it 
merely sought a legal judgment rather than a political maneuver to strengthen 
its bargaining power against China.113 
China countered that the arbitration was motivated purely by politics, 
rendering the entire proceeding unlawful and illegitimate.114  There is little 
to no evidence to support China’s contention.  After all, the UNCLOS 
expressly and legally undercuts China’s primary political basis for claims to 
the South China Sea:  “historic claims” to property going back to the Western 
Han Dynasty.115 
China’s second basis to allege that the tribunal was illegitimate may carry 
more weight.  China argued that the tribunal was inherently biased because 
the United States and Japan were able to influence the appointment of 
arbitrators to the tribunal, thus allegedly stacking the odds in favor of the 
Philippines.116  This claim is unsubstantiated, but even the appearance of 
 
influence sufficiently to cause [certain] states currently inclined to ‘balance’ against China to 
instead join the bandwagon with China”). 
 109. James Pearson & Khanh Vu, Vietnam Mulls Legal Action Over South China Sea 
Dispute, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 4:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-
southchinasea/vietnam-mulls-legal-action-over-south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKBN1XG1D6 
[https://perma.cc/A6WV-QERB] (noting that “a senior government official” stated that 
“Vietnam could explore legal action among various options in its territorial dispute with 
powerful neighbor China in the South China Sea”). 
 110. See David E. Sanger & Michael Crowley, As Biden and Xi Begin a Careful Dance, a 
New American Policy Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/us-china-relations.html 
[https://perma.cc/8ED4-PUKA] (“President Biden is engineering a sharp shift in policy 
toward China, focused on gathering allies to counter Beijing’s coercive diplomacy around the 
world and ensuring that China does not gain a permanent advantage in critical technologies.”). 
 111. See CAI, supra note 29, at 312. 
 112. Statement of Secretary del Rosario, supra note 100. 
 113. See id. 
 114. CAI, supra note 29, at 312. 
 115. See Mastro, supra note 43 (“[S]cholars have meticulously catalogued the dubious 
nature of this history.  And besides, the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
does not grant signatories the right [sic] make claims based on historical legacy, and the 
concept of ‘historic claims’ lacks a clear basis in international law.”). 
 116. MINISTRY OF FOR. AFFS. OF THE PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, Yang Jiechi Gives Interview 
to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for the South China Sea 
Arbitration (July 15, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1381740.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/3KEC-ENKK] (noting that the individual who appointed many of the 
arbitrators, Shunji Yanai, the jurist and then president of the International Tribunal for the 
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partiality tends to sap legitimacy from the tribunal’s award and tarnishes the 
image of the tribunal.  In theory, American and Japanese officials might be 
motivated to abet the Philippines by selecting a favorable arbitral panel, 
thereby containing a rising China.117 
International lawmakers and practitioners must take the wind out of 
China’s sails by addressing the argument that the Philippines v. China 
arbitration and future arbitrations may be biased (or even appear to be 
biased).  The only way to encourage China and similar states to participate 
in future arbitration proceedings that could benefit the United States and its 
allies is to appoint fair and unbiased arbitrators to the PCA and other similar 
dispute resolution bodies.  All parties should desire “clean” panels and 
unbiased decision-makers, who would guarantee a fair process.  More to the 
point, unbiased panels will legitimize future arbitral awards against China. 
After ensuring that there is not even the appearance of an unfair panel, 
states can then shift the focus to China’s blatant methods of lawcraft.  For 
example, states can underscore China’s repeated reliance on the “historical 
territory” argument (with absolutely no basis in international law) or its utter 
refusal to participate in the Philippines v. China arbitration, which China 
could have participated in even while maintaining its objection to the 
forum.118  This is an explicit Chinese attempt to delegitimize international 
legal standards and norms that are hostile to China’s interests—yet another 
example of Chinese lawcraft.119  China was not able to show any bias from 
the selection of arbitrators that ruled in favor of the Philippines and many of 
its claims appear to be wholly lacking in evidentiary support.120  Rather than 
entertain fanciful claims from China that do not find any support in law or 
the factual record, U.S. allies must cast the spotlight on China’s politically-
motivated lawcraft to hold China’s feet to the fire.121 
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C.  Embrace Third Party Involvement 
China alleged that when the Philippines unilaterally initiated an arbitration 
proceeding overseen by a third party, the Philippines violated what was 
supposedly a binding commitment not to do so.122  Namely, China argued 
that the Philippines had entered bilateral Sino-Philippine agreements and was 
bound to settle all relevant disputes through bilateral negotiation to the 
exclusion of third parties.123  Accordingly, Beijing stated that “the 
compulsory third-party dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS would 
not apply.”124  Manila would have no right to seek third-party 
involvement.125  Beijing thus claimed that Manila’s submission to the PCA 
constituted a “deliberate act of bad faith,” despite evidence to the contrary.126 
To be clear, the Philippines made a defensible showing to support its resort 
to the PCA, which the PCA itself reviewed and ultimately supported.127  
After all, the agreement relating to negotiations between the Philippines and 
China was intended to be informal and non-binding.128  More importantly, 
the Philippines v. China arbitration could stand as a watershed moment in 
which the Philippines and similarly situated states in the Indo-Pacific Region 
acknowledge the benefits of non-binding private negotiations that include the 
express right to resort to binding arbitration if negotiations eventually break 
down.  Indeed, bilateral negotiations can even include terms to show implied 
consent of the parties to arbitration if initial negotiations are unfruitful.  In 
this way, states will not be hamstrung if years of private negotiations are 
unproductive while other avenues of dispute resolution would be helpful but 
are off the table. 
Additionally, states can take steps to soften terms that bind parties to 
bilateral negotiations unless no settlement has been reached.  To this point, 
parties can peg the test for abandoning bilateral negotiations to a good faith 
standard, deflating any argument that a party is prematurely resorting to 
arbitration.  It is plainly to China’s advantage to exert its power one-on-one 
with opposing states and insist that all bilateral talks indefinitely remain 
bilateral.  Breaking this outdated paradigm will benefit U.S. allies in the long-
term and preclude Chinese arguments that ongoing talks remain private and 
well-guarded. 
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D.  Clarify Entitlements and Sovereignty 
The Chinese Communist Party has also insisted that the Philippines 
“camouflaged its submissions” to the PCA in the Philippines v. China 
arbitration by offering its submissions as isolated, non-sovereignty-related 
issues requiring narrow legal interpretation in relation to UNCLOS 
provisions, when they were actually related to issues of territorial sovereignty 
and maritime delimitation between Manila and Beijing.129  China’s Position 
Paper of December 7, 2014, for example, states:  “China believes that the 
nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime features in the South 
China Sea cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of 
sovereignty.”130 
Yet, states must be free to voice all good faith allegations, knowing that 
some of them may later be struck.  Ultimately, the Filipino submissions to 
the PCA were indeed partly extrajudicial and partly properly before the 
tribunal.131  This is largely reflected in the PCA’s acceptance of seven out of 
fifteen submissions to the PCA.132  Certain portions of the PCA’s award 
regarding, for example, the “Nine-Dash Line” and China’s claim to the 
maritime areas of the South China Sea, can properly be characterized as 
related to territorial sovereignty.  However, the majority of the other claims 
before the PCA relate to non-territorial entitlements in the South China Sea, 
including high- and low-tide features, rights to the exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf near certain banks, rights to exploit living resources 
(such as fishing), preservation of the environment, construction activities on 
uninhabited reefs, and operation of vessels in a dangerous manner.133 
Complaining states must first separate out disputed entitlements from pure 
questions of state sovereignty.  States will incrementally determine the 
demarcation line between the two categories through precedent and 
customary international law, as further arbitration cases are decided and cited 
in future disputes.134  Next, states must understand the proper forum for 
various complaints, avoiding filing sovereignty-related claims while 
unabashedly filing entitlement claims.  In this way, they can avoid diluting 
their overall complaint by inadvertently including claims that cannot be heard 
by a particular tribunal.  Doing so would disarm China before it is able to use 
lawcraft to potentially discredit genuine claims that are properly before 
tribunals. 
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E.  Nudge Rather Than Shove 
Finally, the United States and its allies will benefit from a gentler approach 
to enforcing international law.  Absent such an approach, China may 
reflexively rebuff legal proceedings that would put smaller states, many of 
them U.S. allies, on surer footing.  The uncompromising Chinese stance in 
the Philippines v. China arbitration reflects the fundamental Sino-Western 
division over the application of international law and agreements to issues 
affecting territory and resources.135  Further, this rejection signifies that 
efforts from the United States or other powers to pressure China may be hard-
fought or may even exacerbate existing tensions in the South China Sea.136 
A crucial lesson from past dynamics is that premature and unilateral efforts 
at conflict resolution through the application of disputed legal instruments or 
proceedings may harden China’s resistance and thereby escalate conflict 
dynamics.137  This holds especially true if China perceives the invocation of 
international arbitration as a Machiavellian strategy aimed at winning a 
conflict through law that cannot otherwise be won in other forums.  Under 
such circumstances, the Philippines and similarly situated states can expect 
heightened resistance from China if the Chinese interpret legal proceedings 
as the calculated use of lawfare.138 
Unquestionably, states should welcome efforts at dispute resolution 
through international legal instruments as an alternative to potentially zero-
sum armed conflict.  However, in conflicts over core interests of the 
contestants, a hard approach may backfire and contribute to further escalation 
if this form of conflict settlement is sought too eagerly by only one party.  
The Philippines made a legally shrewd decision to turn to compulsory 
arbitration under UNCLOS and submit a case to the PCA that partially 
touched upon territorial questions, perhaps knowing that any ruling could 
have vast consequences.  However, this decision was risky, as it was likely 
that this action would engender heightened resistance and confrontation with 
a major neighboring state. 
Still, it is encouraging that China is trending toward greater acceptance of 
outside dispute resolution as tribunals ease many of China’s worst fears.139  
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Since China’s economic debut on the world stage, international law has 
steadily expanded in both scope and content.140  International relations are 
thus governed much more by legal regulation today than they ever were 
before.141  In addition, the number of international tribunals with compulsory 
jurisdiction have significantly increased, which augments the role of the 
judiciary in international law.142  By rendering binding decisions and 
conducting their proceedings in a transparent way, international tribunals 
“enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the process of international 
dispute settlement.”143 
In the past, China has preferred to settle international disputes through 
private negotiation.144  However, since the 1990s, China has begun to 
embrace international regimes, which include dispute settlement mechanisms 
with compulsory jurisdiction, such as the UNCLOS and WTO agreements.145  
As a result, China is increasingly involved in international adjudication, 
whether it likes it or not.  As mentioned above, China has become very 
confident in bringing complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  
As an illustration, in 2007, a total of thirteen disputes were filed in the WTO, 
five of which involved China; in 2008, China was involved in one-third of 
WTO disputes; and in 2009, China was involved in half of all WTO 
disputes.146 
Even when China is not a complainant or respondent, the country appears 
as a third party before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the International 
Court of Justice, or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, by 
submitting statements or presenting oral statements in advisory cases.147  
And while experts may argue that China has only embraced the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body because it fears hampering trade with its partners—
thus impacting its all-important economic growth—presumably China cares 
just as much about fishing and drilling claims near the islands, reefs, and 
shoals of the South China Sea.148 
The Philippines v. China arbitration is a historic decision because it 
signifies smaller states’ growing willingness to exert their rights in a legal 
forum against a rising Chinese state.  Even if China avoided responsibility in 
this arbitration, China will find itself increasingly enmeshed in mandatory 
arbitration clauses by virtue of its treaty obligations and growing 
involvement in international bodies.  The Philippines v. China arbitration is 
also noteworthy because China completely rebuffed the arbitration process, 
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even as it grows more and more accustomed to settling international disputes 
in a judicial forum.  The solutions in this Article should provide fodder to the 
United States and its allies to ensure that this arbitration proceeding will stand 
out as a historic anomaly for China—one in which China used lawcraft to 
dodge its legal obligations and lodge unfounded claims.  In this way, the 
United States can bolster a dispute resolution system that will be maximally 
immune to lawcraft and conducive to third party claims to curb potential 
Chinese abuses. 
CONCLUSION 
China rises as a non-Western power within an international system created 
largely by Western powers.149  The Chinese Communist Party’s agenda is at 
odds not just with the U.S. agenda, but with a Western-oriented system that 
is open, integrated, and rule-based, with sturdy political foundations.150  In 
short, today’s international order is “hard to overturn and easy to join.”151  
The current framework appears able to withstand challenges from Chinese 
lawcraft.  Yet, as demonstrated by Chinese military exercises in the South 
China Sea in early 2021, disputed waters in the Indo-Pacific Region are 
turbulent in both the literal sense and the figurative sense.152  By taking 
appropriate measures, the United States and its allies can do much more to 
force China to clarify its approach to international law and stamp out any 
future lawcraft. 
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